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 This thesis addresses the possible consequences of the Kra Canal on both 
Thai Sea Power and Thai Security. The thesis starts by discussing the history of the 
Kra Canal, from the Ayutthaya period to the present. After analyzing the impact of 
the project on Thai Sea Power using the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the thesis 
concludes that the Kra Canal plays a major role on Thai Sea Power because the canal 
benefits both the Royal Thai Navy and Thai maritime commerce. Finally, the thesis 
examines the possible consequences of the Kra Canal project on Thai Security. In this 
case, the thesis found that the Kra Canal contributes to Thai Security because it 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Kra Canal project will excavate a canal to connect the India Ocean and the 
Gulf of Thailand. The canal will shorten the maritime route between the India and Pacific 
Ocean. A vessel could save approximately 700 nautical miles by using this canal instead 
of passing through the Straits of Malacca. Many Thai scholars believe that the canal will 
boost the Thai economy while helping Thailand to recover rapidly from its economic 
crisis. The Thai government is also interested in the project. The Thai cabinet has set up 
the National Committee to supervise a feasibility study of the project. According to the 
Committee’s Synopsis of the Cabinet Meeting, the canal may be a new way to solve the 
economic and social crisis in Thailand.  
To solve the economic and social crisis as approved by the Cabinet on 11 
September 2001, the feasibility study of the Kra Canal has been 
undertaken by the Ministry of Transport and Communication. To achieve 
the proposed project, the National Committee on Feasibility Study is, 
therefore, set up. In this regard, the Deputy Prime Minister who oversees 
the Ministry of Defence is a Chairman of the Committee.1 
 
However, opponents worry that the cost of the project will outweigh its benefit. 
They are concerned that the Thai economy will worsen if the project does not yield its 
returns. They argue that the Kra Canal may not attract vessels because the Thai ports are 
still underdeveloped compared with Singapore’s port. Even though vessels can save one 
or two days by using the canal, they have to wait many days for a berth and document 
transactions in Thailand.  
Another big concern about the Kra Canal project is the issue of national security. 
The opponents believe that the canal might threaten interests of Thailand’s neighbors. 
Therefore, Thailand would have to face interventions from these countries when the 
project is completed. These outside influences would threaten Thai security. 
In contrast to the opposition of the canal, many Thai senior officers are convinced 
that security issues are no longer a big problem for Thailand. They argue that the Thai 
                                                 
1 Royal Thai Government, Synopsis of Cabinet Meeting, Available [Online]: <http://www.thaigov.go.th/ 
news/cab/44/cab16oct01.htm> [10 Jan 2002] 
1 
military has the capability to deal with these security problems with the canal itself 
providing a strategic advantage for the country to cope with the national security.  
Several former naval commanders-in-chief have expressed their full 
support for the project on grounds that it will enhance the nation’s sea 
power and there by contribute to national security2 
 
In response these arguments, this thesis will examine the impact of the Kra Canal 
on both Thai Sea Power and Thai Security. The thesis will conclude whether the Kra 
Canal project contributes to Thai Sea Power and Thai Security. 
 
A. HYPOTHESIS  
The hypotheses of the paper are: (1) the Kra Canal will enhance Thai Sea Power; 
and (2) the Kra Canal project would contribute to Thai Security.  
 
B. METHODOLOGY  
The methodology in this thesis is composed of archival research, literature 
research of books, theses, electronic documents, and newspaper articles. All of these 
documents will be analyzed and evaluated in order to track the possible consequences of 
the Kra Canal on both the Thai Sea Power and Thai Security. The paper analyzes the six 
elements of Thai Sea Power using the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan. The paper also 
examines whether there is any relationship between the Kra Canal and Thai Sea Power. 
Finally, the paper discusses the consequences of the project on Thai Security by looking 
at influences from Thailand’s neighbors. 
 
C. REASEARCH SCOPE 
The thesis strictly examines on the impact of the Kra Canal on Thai Sea Power 
and on Thai Security. The thesis does not address the environmental impact of the Kra 
Canal. 
                                                 
2Kra Canal at the Crossroad, Available [Online]: <http://scoop.bangkokpost.co.th/bkkpost/2000/ 
bp2000_jan/bp20000123/230100_perspective02.html> [10 Jan 2002] 
 
2 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 Sea Power is a crucial factor for a country to protect its interests and to expand its 
influence over the opponent’s territory. “Sea Power is the use of a nation’s maritime 
strength to promote its interests.”3 However, enhancing Sea Power is difficult for a 
country unless it has the six required elements of Sea Power, which are defined in 
Chapter III. According to A.T. Mahan, these six elements of Sea Power are as follows: 
(1) Geographical Position, (2) Physical Conformation, (3) Extent of Territory, (4) 
Number of Population, (5) National Character, (6) Character of the Government. Of these 
six elements, the first element of Sea Power “Geographical Position” appears to be the 
toughest obstacle for Thailand in order to enhance its Sea Power. Regardless of this 
difficulty, many Thai   scholars believe that the Kra Canal will not only boost Thai 
economy but also enhance the Thai Sea Power.  
Chapter II discusses the history of the Kra Canal, from the Ayutthaya period to 
the Ratanakosin period. The chapter also addresses the obstacles of the project from the 
past to the present. 
Chapter III focuses on Thai Sea Power. This chapter explains the importance of 
Sea Power in terms of military and commercial aspects. Additionally, the chapter 
analyzes the impact of the project on Thai Sea Power using the ideas of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan. 
Chapter IV identifies the possible consequences of the Kra Canal project on Thai 
Security. Addressing, the main concern of whether the Kra Canal will worsen or promote 
Thai Security. This chapter further analyzes the impact of the project on national security 
by focusing on influence from Thailand’s neighbors. 
Chapter V summarizes the new outcome of Thai Sea Power and discuses the 
possible impacts of the canal on Thai Security. This chapter concludes whether the Kra 





                                                 
3 Francis Fitz Randolph, The Strategic Value of the Panama Canal: Value Versus Cost, Monterey: Naval 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
4 
II. HISTORY OF THE KRA CANAL 
The Kra Canal gets its name from the Isthmus of Kra, the narrowest part of the 
Malay Peninsula. The Isthmus of Kra has been known as the most suitable site to cut a 
canal connecting the Gulf of Thailand and the Indian Ocean. According to the Columbia 
Encyclopedia, the width of the Isthmus of Kra is only 40 miles.   
Kra, Isthmus of, narrow neck of the Malay Peninsula, c.40 mi (60 km) 
wide, SW Thailand, between the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Thailand. 
It has long been the proposed site of a ship canal that would bypass the 
congested Straits of Malacca.4 
 
Even though the Isthmus is thin, the attempt to excavate a canal across the 
Isthmus has incurred a variety of problems that vary in nature and coincide with Thai 
history. The first idea of excavating the canal is traceable to the Ayutthaya period during 
the reign of King Narai the Great. 
Throughout this chapter, most of the historical events are based on the book 
Thailand, a Country Study, edited by Barbara Leitch LePoer and published by Federal 
Research Division, Library of Congress. 
 
A. THE AYUTTHAYA PERIOD 
Ayutthaya was founded in 1350 during which time Thailand was known as Siam. 
The capital of Siam, Ayutthaya, located in a fertile area on the bank of the Chao Phraya 
River was named after the city of Ayodhya in India. “Ayodhya in northern India, the city 
of the hero Rama in the Hindu epic Ramayana.”5 Ayutthaya, at the beginning, was a 
small city, which was under the influence of Khmer empire.  
During the fifteenth century, Ayutthaya became much stronger. “By the end of the 
fourteenth century, Ayutthaya was regarded as the strongest power in Southeast Asia.”6 
During this century, Ayutthaya was successful in expelling the influence of the Khmer 
                                                 
4 The Columbia Encyclopedia. Sixth Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 
5 Barbara Leith LePoer, Thailand: a Country Study. Federal Research Division: Library of Congress. p.10. 
6 Ibid., p.11. 
5 
from the Kingdom of Siam. Furthermore, Ayutthaya was able to enlarge its influence 
over the Khmer empire when Siam conquered the capital of the Khmer empire in 1431 
and became a dominant city in the region. 
During the sixteenth century, Ayutthaya was known as the biggest trading center 
of Southeast Asia. Siam contacted and traded not only with the Asian countries but with 
the European countries as well. Two European groups came to Siam in this century: the 
Portuguese were the first to reach Siam in 1511 followed by the Dutch in 1592. 
In the seventeenth century, additional groups of Europeans reached Siam during 
the reign of King Narai the Great (1656-1688). These European groups were English, 
Spanish, and French traders.7 Of these European groups, Siam seemed to have a special 
relationship with French traders. The diplomatic relationship between Siam and France 
was strong. “During the 1680’s, splendid embassies were exchanged between King Narai 
and King Louis XIV.”8 Both sides gained benefits from this relationship. Siam could rely 
on French power to deter threats from the Dutch. In return, France got privileges for 
doing businesses in Siam; Siam always granted all French requests, including the request 
to survey for a new sea-trading route.  
In 1677, the idea of excavating the Kra Canal emerged for the first time by a 
French engineer, M. De La Mar, who conducted the survey to find a new sea-trading 
route between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea. His study found that it was 
possible to excavate the canal across the Isthmus of Kra from Songkla in Thailand to 
Tavoy in Burma.9 
France wanted to excavate the canal because it would make France gain 
commercial advantages over the European countries that controlled the Straits of 
Malacca. However, the project was stopped because the relationship between Siam and 
France became worse after King Narai’s death.  
                                                 
7 Kingdoms of South East Asia. Available [Online]: <http://berclo.net/page00/00en-sea-history.html>        
[5 Feb 2002] 
8 King of Thailand, Available [Online]: <http://www.thaimain.org/eng/monarchy/ayuttaya/narai.html>     
[5 Feb 2002] 
9 Sea Span, Kra Canal Mega-Project, southen Thailand, Available [Online]: <http://www.icsea.or.id/    
sea-span/message.cfm?ID=122> [6 Feb 2002] 
6 
In 1688, Siam cut its relationship with France expelling all French from 
Ayutthaya. Not only did the relationship between Siam and France cease, but Siam also 
cut its relationship with every European country up until the Ratanakosin period began. 
Ayutthaya came to an end in 1765 after the Burmese invaded Ayutthaya again 
virtually destroying it. The Grand Palace and temples were burned and thousands of 
Thais were captured and deported to Burma. The survival of the Thai nation was 
uncertain until Phaya Taksin was able to fortify a new kingdom at Thonburi, 90 
kilometers south of Ayutthaya, on the bank of the Chao Phaya River. Phaya Taksin 
established himself as King in 1767. 
 
B. THE RATANAKOSIN PERIOD 
After King Taksin’s death, Phaya Chakkri succeeded the throne; he moved the 
capital city across the Chao Phaya River from Thonburi to Bangkok.10 He built a new 
Grand Palace at Bangkok establishing himself as King Rama I of the Ratanakosin period.    
In 1793, during the reign of King Rama I, Phra Rajawangborworn 
Mahasurasihanat, King Rama I’s brother, raised the idea of the Kra Canal project again. 
Phra Rajawangborworn argued that the canal would be the fastest way to send 
reinforcements from Bangkok to help towns along the Andaman Sea when they were 
being invaded by Burmese troops. This was the first time that the main purpose for 
excavating the canal emphasized national security.11 
However, the threat from Burma had dramatically declined after Burma was 
invaded by China in 1766.  
The Chinese were disturbed by Burmese expansion into the Shan states, 
Chiang Mai and Laos, which bordered their southwestern province of 
Yunnan and which were considered, along with the Burmese Kingdom 
itself, to be part of their comprehensive ‘Tribute System’.12 
                                                 
10 Thai History, Ratanakosin Reriod, Available [Online]: <http://sunsite.au.ac.th/thailand/thai_his/ 
ratanakosin.html>   [10 Feb 2002] 
11 The long and winding canal, Available [Online]: <http://www.icsea.or.id/sea-span/message?=122>         
[10 Feb 2002] 
12 Frederica M. Bunge, Burma, a Country Study, Foreign Area Studies, the American University 
(Washington, D.C.) p.11. 
7 
As a result of the declining threat from Burma, the benefit of the Kra Canal in 
terms of national security also diminished. Eventually, the project was disregarded and 
forgotten until the reign of King Rama IV.  
During the reign of King Rama IV (1851-1868), the Kra Canal was brought back 
into public attention again. At this time, the British got permission from King Rama IV to 
excavate the canal from Ranong to Chumporn. It was the shortest route.  
Even though an initial excavation had been started, the project was finally 
decleared unsuccessful because English engineers found the mountain ranges the biggest 
obstacle in accomplishing the project. If the project were to be completed, its cost would 
have been exorbitant. Therefore, the British stopped excavating the Kra Canal project. 
Nevertheless, the British had already gotten the full benefits from the Strait of Malacca. 
In 1866, France asked King Rama IV permission to excavate the Kra Canal.13 
However, King Rama IV did not grant permission to France because if the project were 
completed, the British interest in the Straits of Malacca could be negatively affected. 
Thailand did not want to destroy this good relationship with the British since Thailand 
relied on British power to balance French influences. 
During the reign of King Rama V (1868-1910), France continued to push for 
excavating the canal. This time, France sent Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had experience in 
digging the Suez Canal, to ask permission to excavate the canal from King Rama V. The 
request was denied since King Rama V was concerned that the project would impact both 
British interests in the Straits of Malacca and Thai security: the project might bring 
French influence to Thailand. During that time, French influence was perceived as the 
most dangerous threat for Thai sovereignty. 
Even more than British, France posed a serious danger to Siamese 
independence. The French occupied Cochinchina (southern Vietnam, 
around the Mekong Delta) in 1863. From there they extended their 
influence into Cambodia, over which Vietnam and Siam had long been 
struggling for control.14 
 
 
                                                 
13 History, Available [Online]: <http://www.kracanal.or.th/kra_history.htm> [5 Feb 2002]. 
8 
C. THE CONSTITUTION PERIOD 
On June 24, 1932, Thailand changed its political system from an absolute 
monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. Since that event, political decision-making was 
transferred from the King to the civilian government.  
After the end of World War I, Thailand also faced a depression like other 
countries around the world. To deal with the depression, the Thai Prime Minister, Phaya 
Phahol Pholphayuhasena, reviewed the proposal to excavate the Kra Canal in 1935. 
Although the project was expected to help the Thai economy, the proposal was canceled 
again because Thailand did not have enough funds to undertake the project.  
When World War II started, Thailand encountered a great external threat from 
Japan. The Japanese military forces had been invading and expanding their influences 
over Southeast Asia. At that time, the Thai government, headed by Field Marshal Pore 
Phibul Songkram, chose to ally with Japan and declared war on the British.  
After the end of World War II, not only did Thailand have to send rice to the 
British for war reparation, but Thailand also had to sign a peace treaty with Britain and 
India in 1942.15 The seventh article of the treaty stated: “Siam undertakes to construct no 
canal linking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Siam  (i.e., across the Kra Isthmus) with 
out British consent.”16 According to the treaty, the Kra Canal project was blocked again 
for twelve years. 
After the phasing out of the treaty in 1954,17 the Kra Canal was brought back 
again in 1958. The Thai government granted permission to study the feasibility of the Kra 
Canal project to Mr. K.Y. Chow of the Thai Oil Refining Company, Leam Thong 
Phattana Co, Ltd. However, the National Security Council blocked the project because of 
national security concerns. The National Security Council was afraid that the Kra Canal 
would encourage the separatist movement in the southern part of Thailand. 
In 1970, it was the second time that the Thai government gave permission to Mr. 
K.Y Chow to study the feasibility of the Kra Canal. At this time, Mr. Chow hired a U.S. 
                                                 
14 Barbara Leith LePoer, Thailand, a Country Study, Federal Research Division: Library of Congress. p.22. 
15 Ibid., p.33. 
16 Keesing’s contemporary archives. London: Keesing’s Limited., [1931-c1986]). p.7695A. 
17 The long and winding canal, Available [Online]: <http://www.icsea.or.id/sea-span/message?=122>         
[10 Feb 2002] 
9 
consultant, Tippetts-Abbet-McCarthy-Stratten (TAMS), to conduct a feasibility study for 
the Kra Canal project. Even though the study was completed, the excavation could not 
start because of Thai political turmoil: the instability of the Thai government affected the 
progression of the Kra Canal project. 
 
D. THE PRESENT 
In 1999 the Thai government reviewed the Kra Canal project again because it 
believed that the Kra Canal might help Thailand solve both a short and long-term 
economic crisis. On October 16, 2001, the Thai government set up the National 
Committee on Feasibility Study to supervise the possibility of the Kra Canal project. The 
study, undertaken by The Ministry of Transport and Communication, was expected to 




From the Ayutthaya period until the present, the benefits of the project might be 
divided into two categories; economy and security. The benefit of the project in terms of 
the economy seems to be a dominant reason for excavating the Kra Canal. However, the 
benefit of the canal in terms of security is also important for Thailand. For example, 
during the reign of King Rama I, the main reason for excavating the canal came from the 
security issue. This is the reason why the supporters of the project believe that the Kra 
Canal will not only boost the Thai economy, but also enhance Thai security.  
On the other hand, the costs of the Kra Canal project could be divided into two 
categories. The first category is the problem of national security. The security issue is the 
major concern for the project. Security issues always stopped the project during the past. 
For example, during the reign of King Rama V, Thailand did not allow France to 
excavate the Kra Canal because French influence was perceived as the most dangerous 
threat for Thailand. The second category is the problem of funds and their unintended 
consequences. This problem directly relates to the Thai economy. The opponents worry 
10 
that the project may not yield its return. If the latter assumption is true, it is difficult to 
say how Thailand would pay back the loan. 
To deal with the benefits and costs of the Kra Canal project, Chapter III of the 
thesis applies the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan to address the benefits of the Kra Canal. 
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III. SEA POWER 
This chapter focuses on the impact of the Kra Canal on Thai Sea Power 
examining whether the canal enhances Thai Sea Power. This chapter starts by discussing 
the importance of Sea Power using the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan. After clarifying 
the importance of Sea Power, the chapter continues to examine Thai Sea Power in 
military and commercial terms. The chapter finally discusses the six principle elements 
that affect Sea Power determining the impact of the Kra Canal on Thai Sea Power. 
 
A. SEA POWER AND WEALTH 
Creating wealth is the ultimate goal of every country in the world. A developing 
country tries to increase wealth to become a developed country. By the same token, a 
developed country also needs more wealth to sustain its growth. Because of this 
intention, countries apply a variety of strategic approaches for creating wealth. Although 
these approaches vary from country to country, the most effective approach to wealth 
seems to be an encouraging commerce, as Adam Smith advised. “In 1776, Adam Smith 
theorized in The Wealth of Nations that the most effective way for an industrial nation to 
increase its wealth was to encourage commerce.”18 
Many examples confirm that countries that encourage commerce are successful in 
generating wealth. In the fifteenth century, Portugal was successful in creating wealth 
because it realized the importance of commerce and sent a commercial fleet to trade with 
many other countries. The Netherlands also became a wealthy country because of its 
commerce during that time.  
However, a prosperous commerce may not last long unless a country has a strong 
navy to support its maritime commerce. For example, in 1580 the Portuguese prosperity 
started to decline because its maritime commerce was challenged by Spain. With its 
superior navy, Spain received full benefits from controlling the worldwide maritime 
commerce and excluding Portugal from participating. Without a strong navy, commerce 
                                                 
18 Tom Veblen, Creating Wealth, Available [Online]: <http://www.cosmos-club.org/journals/2000 
/veblen.html> [16 Apr 2002] 
13 
is vulnerable. When commerce is challenged, “the wealth of the nation” is automatically 
uncertain. To assure its commerce, a country has to have a strong navy.  
From this perspective, the two factors that play a crucial role in a nation’s 
prosperity are a flourishing commerce and a strong navy. According to A.T. Mahan, a 
combination of these two factors is Sea Power. A.T. Mahan, a President of the United 
States Naval War College, studied naval history and formulated many brilliant concepts 
about Sea Power. He found that Sea Power of nations is derived from a combination of a 
prosperous commerce and a great navy.   
The sea power of England therefore was not merely in the great navy, with 
which we too commonly and exclusively associate it; France had had such 
a navy in 1688, and it shriveled away like a leaf in the fire. Neither was it 
in a prosperous commerce alone; a few years after the date at which we 
have arrived, the commerce of France took on fair proportions, but the 
first blast of war swept it off the seas as the navy of Cromwell had once 
swept that of Holland. It was in the union of the two, carefully fostered, 
that England made the gain of sea power over and beyond all other 
States.19 
 
Sea Power is a vital tool for a country to promote and protect its interest. The 
more Sea Power a country has, the more advantages a country has to harvest its interests. 
This, therefore, explains the importance of Sea Power for nations. 
 
B. THAI SEA POWER 
History makes Thailand realize the importance of Sea Power. In 1893, Thailand 
and France had a conflict over the disputed area, Laos. When the fighting started, France 
sent its warships to block Thailand. Thailand severely suffered from the blockade 
because all necessary goods, such as medicine, clothing, and fuel suffered shortages. 
Thailand could not import these items because commercial ships that sailed to Bangkok 
were blocked. As the result of the blockade, Thailand surrendered its control over Laos to 
France.  
                                                 
19 A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783,Dover Publications, Inc., New York. 
p.22 
14 
When fighting broke out between French and Siamese forces in Laos in 
April 1893, the French sent gunboats to blockade Bangkok. At gunpoint, 
The Siamese agreed to the cession of Laos.20 
 
This event is a lesson-learned for Thailand. It proves that Thai Sea Power is a 
vital issue for the nation.  
Since Sea Power is derived from a combination of the strength of navy and the 
prosperity of commerce, the chapter examines Thai Sea Power by focusing on both 
military and commercial aspects. In measuring the strength of the Royal Thai Navy, the 
chapter examines two vital components: the Royal Thai Fleet and its naval bases. At the 
same time, the chapter examines the prosperity of Thai maritime commerce by looking at 
the Thai commercial fleet and seaports. 
1.  The Royal Thai Fleet 
The Royal Thai Fleet, which continues to develop, has a long history starting with 
its first modernization during the post-World War II period. Today, the Royal Thai Fleet 
is one of the most modern navies in Southeast Asia with more than 160 ships to 
operate.21 
The Royal Thai Fleet organizes these ships into seven squadrons by their 
characteristics: (1) Helicopter Carrier Squadron (2) Frigate Squadron One (3) Frigate 
Squadron Two (4) Coastal Patrol Squadron (5) Amphibious Squadron (6) Minesweeper 
Squadron (7) Auxiliary Squadron.  
These ships are the core power of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) in achieving its 
duties. According to the Thai Defense Strategy, the Royal Thai Navy has duties as 
follows: 
(1) The Royal Thai Navy must protect maritime national interests in 
coastal areas, the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, 
and also defend the country at sea.  
(2) The Navy must increase its capabilities in order to efficiently 
counter threats from the sea, protect natural resources and 
                                                 
 20 Franco-Siamese War 1893,Available [Online]: <http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/foxtrot/ 
 francesiam1893.htm> [1 Apr. 2002]. 
21 Patrick N Bright, Asian-Naval Forces overview, Available [Online]: < http://proquest.umi.com>               
[1 Apr. 2002]. 
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industrial energy sources, maintain the law of the sea, and also 
provide continuous protection for sea lines of communication.22 
 
Type  Active  Building   Projected 
Aircraft Carriers  1     
Frigates  14     
Corvettes  5  3   
Fast Attack Craft (Missile)  6     
Fast Attack Craft (Gun)  3     
Large Patrol Craft  6     
Coastal Patrol Craft  46  3  15 
MCM Support Ship  1     
Minehunters  3     
Coastal Minesweepers  2     
MSBs  12     
LSTs  7    1 
LSMs  2     
Hovercraft  3     
Survey Vessels  5     
Replenishment Ship  1     
Tankers/Transports  8     
Training Ships  2      1 
 
Table 1. Type of His Thai Majesty Ships in the Royal Thai Flee 
Source: From Jane, Administration, Thailand, Available [Online]: <http://www4.janes.  
com/ search97cgi/s97_cgi?action=View&VdkVgwKey=/content1> [29 Apr. 2002] 
 
Even though the Royal Thai Fleet has more than 160 ships to operate, this number 
is not enough to fulfill these various duties. The Royal Thai Fleet still needs more ships, 
                                                 
22 Royal Thai Supreme Command Headquarter, Forces Structure, Available [Online]: <http://www.schq. 
mi.th/structure_e.htm> [20 April 2002] 
16 
especially Off Shore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), to continuously patrol both sides of the Thai 
coast; the Thai coastline is 3,219 kilometers.  
 
2. Thai Naval Bases 
The Royal Thai Navy has four main naval bases: (1) Bangkok Naval Base (2) 
Sattahip Naval Base (3) Songkhla Naval Base (4) Phag-Nga Naval Base. Of these four 
bases, three are sites of Naval Area Command’s headquarters; the Royal Thai Navy 
divides its area of operation into three regional Area Commands, and sets up the Naval 
Area Command to oversee each regional Area Command.  
 
Command   Headquarter   Area of Operations 
First Naval Area Command  Sattahip  Eastern Gulf of Thailand 
Second Naval Area Command  Songkhla  Western Gulf of Thailand 
Third Naval Area Command   Phag-Nga   Andaman Sea 
 
Table 2. Naval Area Command, by Command 
Source: From Jane, Navy, Thailand, Available [Online]: <http://www.janes.com/search 
97cgi/ s97_cgi?action=View&VdkVgwKey=/content> [29 Apr. 2001]. 
 
Bangkok Naval Base is located in Bangkok where the Thai Amphibious and 
Minesweeper Squadron are headquartered. The base has two big dockyards to repair all 
naval ships except HTMS Chakri Naruebet, a helicopter carrier. The base also has all 
necessary facilities to support crewmembers, such as hospitals and recreation centers.  
Sattahip Naval Base is located at Chonburi Province, south-central Thailand. This 
base has many excellent facilities to support crewmembers. All squadrons, except the 
Amphibious and Minesweeper Squadron, are headquartered there including the First 
Naval Area Command. The base has a small dockyard to repair ships that have 
displacement less than 750 tons. Ships that have a displacement over 750 tons are sent to 
the dockyards at Bangkok Naval Base; however, a new dockyard at Sattahip Naval Base 
is under construction. This dockyard will become the biggest naval dockyard in Thailand. 
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Its dry dock will be able to support all big ships, including the helicopter carrier with a 
11,400-ton displacement.  
Songkhla Naval Base is located at Songkhla Province, in the southern part of 
Thailand. The Second Naval Area Command is headquartered at this base. Most of the 
ships operating at Songkhla come from the Frigate Squadron Two and Coastal Patrol 
Squadron. These ships are rotated every six months.  
Phag-Nga Naval Base is located at Phag-Nga Province, in the southern part of 
Thailand on the Andaman Ocean. The Third Naval Area Command is headquartered at 
this base. Most of the ships operating in this area come from the Frigate Squadron One 
and Coastal Patrol Squadron. These ships have to operate on this base for one year before 
going back to their squadron. 
Of these four naval bases, Bangkok and Sattahip Naval Bases are capable of both 
repairing ships and providing adequate facilities for crewmembers. In contrast, the other 
two bases do not have enough facilities for crewmembers or a dockyard to support ships. 
The situation is rather critical for the Phag-Nga Naval Base. If ships operating there need 
a repair, they have to sail from the Andaman Ocean to Bangkok Naval Base. 
3. Thai Commercial Fleet 
Commercial vessels are an effective tool for transport because they carry a large 
volume of goods at a relatively low cost. Even though Thailand has a high number of 
imports and exports each year, the Thai commercial fleet is still small compared with 
other countries in this region, such as Singapore and Indonesia. As quoted by the 
Structure of Maritime Industry, “Most of the Thai commercial fleet consists of 297 
vessels, total DWT 3,173,332 including bulk carriers, container feeder ships, tankers and 
LPG carriers.”23 Nevertheless, there are two main reasons why Thai commercial fleet is 
relatively small: 
• An investment in a maritime industry requires tremendous capital. This 
amount of money is too much for Thai investors; instead Thai investors 
prefer to invest in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) because they get 
more privileges from the Thai government.  
                                                 
23 Structure of Maritime Industry, Thai Commercial Fleet, Available [Online]: <http://www.tmn.co.th/Mai 
_getin.html> [3 Apr. 2002]. 
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• Most Thais are less interested in maritime commerce. The Thai workforce 
in this sector is a small compared with the workforce in the agriculture, 
industrial, or service sectors. Furthermore, Thais who have knowledge or 
experience in maritime commerce are inadequate.  
 
4. Thai Commercial Ports 
The main ports in Thailand are (1) Bangkok Port (2) Laem Chabang Port (3) 
Sattahip Commercial Port (4) Songkhla Port (5) Phuket Port. 
Bangkok Port, built in 1938, is located on the left side of the Chao Phraya River. 
The port has some advantages over the other port because it is located in Bangkok, the 
biggest market in Thailand. Merchandise unload there can reach customers quickly. The 
port, moreover, has many facilities to support commercial vessels, such as a Rail 
Mounted Shoreside Gantry Crane and Mobile Crane. Nevertheless, the port has 
limitations due to its physical location. This physical location becomes a potential 
problem for Bangkok Port because it precludes large displacement vessels from accessing 
it. “Since the Bangkok Port is a river port, vessels entering the port are limited to a 
maximum length of 172 meters and draught of 8.2 meters.”24 Due to this limitation, the 
Port Authority of Thailand decided to construct a new port, Laem Chabang Port, to serve 
large displacement vessels that could not access Bangkok Port. 
Laem Chabang Port is located on the Eastern coast of the Gulf of Thailand. It is 
the biggest port in Thailand in terms of area and capability to handle containers. “More 
than 80 per cent of seaborne cargo handled by LMC is containerized.”25 It has a 
capability to serve any type of vessels. The port also has all necessary facilities and 
modern equipments to support a commercial vessel. Moreover, the port provides all 
needed services for a maritime commerce, such as cargo handling, warehousing, and 
cargo distribution. 
Sattahip Commercial Port is also located on the Eastern coast of the Gulf of 
Thailand. It is about 184 kilometers from Bangkok. This port is a deep-sea port. 
                                                 
24 Bangkok Port, About BKP, Available [Online]: < http://www.bangkok-port.com/ie/en/html/access.html> 
[3 Apr. 2002] 
25 Leam Chabang Port, Prime Location in Asia, Available [Online]: <http://www.lcp.pat.or.th/main_about   
_pri.htm> [4 Apr. 2002]. 
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However, few big vessels use its services because the port does not have enough facilities 
and equipment. The port lacks heavy handling equipment, such as a Gantry Crane. 
Furthermore, most facilities of the port are under construction.  
Songkhla and Phuket Ports are located in the southern part of Thailand. Songkhla 
Port is located in the Gulf of Thailand while Phuket port is located on the other side, the 
Andaman Ocean. These two ports have the same disadvantage as Sattahip Port. They lack 
a heavy handling equipment to load and unload containers from a commercial vessel. 
5. Summary 
In terms of military aspects, the Royal Thai Fleet needs more ships to maintain its 
modernization and its capability to protect the maritime national interest on both oceans. 
Moreover, the Royal Thai Navy should improve Phag-Nga Naval Base since it is the 
major base on the Andaman Ocean. This base should have a maintenance capability to 
support ships that operate in this area. 
In terms of commercial aspects, Thailand has a small commercial fleet when 
compared with its neighboring countries. This small commercial fleet cannot respond to 
the growing demand of Thai imports and exports causing Thailand to lose money by 
using the services of foreigner sea liners. Furthermore, the Thai workforce in this sector 
is inadequate because Thais are less interested in maritime commerce.  
The Thai commercial ports are also important for increasing Thai Sea Power. This 
chapter found that a good port location might not attract a commercial vessel if the port 
does not have enough facilities and equipment to serve a vessel. For example, the 
Sattahip Commercial Port, which is a good location, has only a few vessels using its 
services because the port lacks the facilities and equipment. 
In order to enhance Thai Sea Power, Thailand needs to improve the following 
areas: 
• The Thai government should allocate additional budget for the Royal 
Thai Navy to procure new ships. The Royal Thai Fleet needs these ships 
to sustain its operational capability.  
• The naval base on the Andaman Ocean should be improved. At least, it 
has to have a maintenance capability to repair the ships operating at the 
base.  
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• The government should encourage Thais to appreciate the importance of 
the maritime commerce.  
• The commercial ports should improve their services to increase their 
competitiveness.  
If these four changes are implemented, Thai Sea Power will remarkably increase. 
However, it is a difficult task for Thailand to improve these four areas under the current 
economic constraint unless Thailand decides to excavate the Kra Canal. 
 
C. THE KRA CANAL AND THAI SEA POWER 
According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, there are six principle elements that affect the 
Sea Power of nations. A.T. Mahan proposed that: 
The principal conditions affecting Sea Power of nations may be 
enumerated as follows: I. Geographical Position. II. Physical 
Conformation, including, as connected therewith, natural production and 
climate. III. Extent of Territory. IV. Number of Population. V. Character 
of the People. VI. Character of the Government, including therein the 
national institutions.26 
 
Thai Sea Power is also based on Mahan’s six elements. Of these six elements, the 
Kra Canal is directly involved with the first element: Geographical Position. 
Geographical position is the first element that affects the Sea Power of nations 
and is the most challenging element to improve. In A.T. Mahan’s belief, two obstacles 
make Thailand’s geographical position vary from what he calls a good geographical 
position.  
First, Thailand is not located along sea lines of communication. A.T. Mahan 
argues that a country located along sea lines of communication has many strategic 
advantages. For example, a country can easily promote its maritime commerce. 
Moreover, the country can block its competitors from accessing the lines of 
communication.  
                                                 
26 A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783,Dover Publications, Inc., New York. 
p.28. 
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Nature has so placed a country that it has easy access to the high sea itself, 
which at the same time it controls one of the great thoroughfares of the 
world’s traffic, it is evident that strategic value of its positions is very 
high.27 
  
Second, the Thai geographical position obstructs the two big oceans, the 
Andaman and the Gulf of Thailand. A.T. Mahan argues that a country located between 
two big oceans has to spend a lot of money to protect both sides unless it has a 
passageway between them. A location like Thailand causes vulnerability. A.T. Mahan 
stated in his book, “the two oceans would be either a source of great weakness or a cause 
of enormous expense, had it a large sea commerce on both coasts.”28 
If Thailand excavates the Kra Canal, the canal makes the Thai geographical 
position conform to A.T. Mahan’s idea. Since Thailand will be along a line of 
communication and will have a passageway between the Gulf of Thailand and the 
Andaman Ocean. 
A new line of communication would yield a lot of benefits for Thai maritime 
commerce by helping Thai ports become more competitive: vessels would have a high 
tendency to use Thai seaports when they pass through the Kra Canal. When these ports 
have more vessels using their services, building up new facilities and equipment is 
feasible. Moreover, the Thai shipyards also get benefits from the project because vessels 
that have a long journey always need maintenance and repair. Finally, those Thais 
looking for a job would benefit from the increase of jobs associated with maritime 
commerce; therefore, Thailand’s unemployment rate would drop. 
The new passageway would also provide many strategic advantages for Thailand. 
The Kra Canal would enable the Royal Thai Navy to move its naval forces to protect both 
sides effectively. Ships would save approximately 700 nautical miles by using the Kra 
Canal instead of passing through the Straits of Malacca. If an average speed of ship is 16 
miles per hour, the Kra Canal will save about 44 hours. This amount of time is 
significant, especially during a crisis. For example, when a crisis happens on the 
Andaman Ocean, the Third Naval Area Command could get timely reinforcements from 
                                                 
27 Ibid., p.32. 
28 Ibid., p.29. 
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the Sattahip Naval Base. At present, the situation on the Andaman Ocean is still sensitive 
due to territorial conflicts between Thailand and Burma.  
Territorial tensions remain over islands on the border of Burma’s 
Taninthayi (formerly Tenasserim) Province and Thailand’s Ranong 
Province leading to clashes between the two countries’ naval forces late in 
200029 
  
The Thai fishing fleet would also benefit from the Kra Canal: the Thai fishing 
fleet is the third largest in the world.30 When the Kra Canal is completed, these Thai 
fishing boats would be able to sail to both oceans without passing through the water of 
Thailand’s neighboring countries. The Thai fishing boats always encounter troubles when 
they pass through the water of other countries, even though they follow the condition 
stipulated in international law. Pirates always threaten Thai fishing boats while sailing 
through that area.  
 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter found that the Kra Canal plays a major role on Thai Sea Power. The 
canal will provide many strategic advantages for Thailand. If a crisis occurs on the 
Andaman Ocean, the canal will ensure that the Royal Thai Fleet meet the threat because 
the ships from the First and Second Naval Area Command could quickly reinforce the 
Third Naval Area Command. 
Today the number of Thai naval ships operating in the Andaman Ocean is less 
than the number of Burmese ships: the Thai fleet operating in the area of Third Naval 
Area Command includes one Frigate or Corvette, one Large Patrol Craft, and five Coastal 
Patrol Crafts; the Burmese fleet includes two Corvettes, six Guided Missile Patrols, and a 
number of Coastal Patrol Crafts. Moreover, the Burmese Navy has ordered three new 
Frigates from China to operate in this area.31 Therefore, the Royal Thai Navy needs more 
ships to compete with the Burmese Navy. If Thailand has the Kra Canal, the procurement 
                                                 
29Jane, Patrol Craft Market, Available [Online]: <http://www4.janes.com/search97cgi/s97_cgi?action    
=View&VdkVgwKey=/content1/janesdata/srep/srep089/s0890011.htm&Collection=current&Prod_Na
me=SREP089&QueryZip=([0.8](<THESAURUS>Burmese+navy)+<or>++[1.0](+<THESAURUS>B
urmese+navy+<and>+(<THESAURUS>Burmese+navy+<in>+title)+))& >  [15 Apr. 2002].  
30 Jane, Navy, Thailand, Available [Online]: <http://www4.janes.com/search97cgi> [29 Apr. 2002]. 
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31 Jane, Navy, Myanmar, Available [Online]: <http://www4.janes.com/search97cgi> [29 Apr. 2002]. 
for new ships will be not critical because the Royal Thai Feet could efficiently mobilize 
its ships from one side to the other. From this perspective, the Kra Canal enhances the 
competence of the Thai Royal Fleet. 
In the commercial aspect, the Kra Canal enhances both the Thai commercial fleet 
and Thai ports. The Thai commercial fleet will gain many advantages from passing 
through the Kra Canal, such as a lower fee. Hence, sea liners that regularly pass through 
the Kra Canal could get more benefits if they chose to register their ships as Thai ships. 
When the number of sea liners registering as Thai ships increase, the Thai commercial 
fleet grows. The Kra Canal will also make the Thai ports more attractive because vessels 
prefer to use the ports located near their route. The more the vessels use Thai ports, the 


















IV. NATIONAL SECURITY 
Even though the benefits of the Kra Canal are obvious for Thailand, it is still 
uncertain whether the Thai government will decide to excavate the Kra Canal. The Thai 
government and many Thais still express concern that the Kra Canal might impact Thai 
Security.  
Thai military officers claim, however, that security issues are no longer a critical 
problem for Thailand. They argue that the Thai forces have the capabilities to deal with 
these security problems while the canal, itself, enhances Thai Sea Power coping with the 
national security. 
In response to these arguments, this chapter examines whether the Kra Canal 
project would contribute to Thai Security. The chapter starts by examining the situations 
that possibly affect Thai Security by focusing on influence from Thailand’s neighbors. 
After identifying situations that might affect Thai Security, the chapter examines whether 
or not the Kra Canal project would help Thailand to handle Thai Security. 
 
A. INFLUENCE OF THAILAND’S NEIGHBORS 
This chapter examines how each of Thailand’s neighbors might affect Thai 
Security. The four countries that will be examined are Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Malaysia. 
1. Thailand’s Neighbors 
Thailand, covering an area of 514,000 square kilometers, shares borders with 
Burma to the west and north, Lao P.D.R. to the north and northeast, Cambodia to the east 
and Malaysia to the south (See Figure 1). These four countries are considered potential 
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Figure 1: Map of Thailand  
Source: From Aron Stern, Thailand’s Migration Situation and its Relations with APEC 
Members and Other Countries in Southeast Asia, Available [Online]: <http://www 
chula.ac.th/INSTITUTE/ARCM/apec.htm> [20 Apr. 2002]. 
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B. BURMA 
Burma or Myanmar is one of the biggest countries in Southeast Asia. The 
population of this country is composed of various ethnic groups.  
Burma with 261,000 square miles is the largest country in mainland 
Southeast Asia. Burma’s population, estimated at 48 million, is divided 
between ethnic Burmans (65% of the total) and a number of diverse ethnic 
groups.32  
 
    
Ethnic Group Population Ethnic Group Population 
    
Burman 32,000,000 Mon 900,000 
    
Shan 5,000,000 Wa 650,000 
    
Karen 5,000,000 Kachin 650,000 
    
Arakan 3,000,000 Chin 650,000 
    
Indian 900,000 Naga 130,000 
    
 
Table 1. Ethnic groups in Burma, by Name of ethnic groups 
Source: Report on Human Rights in Burma: Background and current status. 
Journal of Third World Studies; Americus; Fall 2001; Ross Marlay; Bryan Ulmer 
 
In summary, from the Report on Human Rights in Burma (Americus 2001), 
Burma is still ruled by a highly authoritarian military regime known as the State Peace 
and Development Council (SPDC). The SPDC has never recognized the concept of 
human rights. Freedom of assembly, workers’ rights, freedom of the press, or 
                                                 
32 Report on human rights in Burma: Background and current status. Journal of Third World Studies; 
Americus; Fall 2001; Ross Marlay; Bryan Ulmer; Available [Online]: <http://proquest.umi.com> [20 
Apr. 2002] 
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independent judiciary do not exist, whereas, extrajudicial killings continue to occur. 
Human rights abuses in Burma have continued since the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC) seized power in September 1988. In 1997 the SLORC dissolved and 
renamed itself as the SPDC.  
Most of ethnic Burmese groups have been fighting to free themselves from the 
Burmese military regime, especially the groups that live near the Thai-Burmese border. 
The fighting in the area not only creates conflicts within Burma but also worsens the 
relationship between Thailand and Burma. Burmese forces frequency cross the border to 
hunt ethnic groups retreating to Thai territory. Moreover, some Thais living near the 
border are injured or lose their lives by Burmese artillery bombardment during the 
fighting. In response to this threat, Thailand uses many diplomatic approaches to protest 
and to seek compensation; however, the Burmese military regime pays little attention to 
the protests and continues to wipe out these ethnic groups.33 In recent years, the Burmese 
forces have frequently invaded Thai territory to hunt down their opponents, which leads 
to confrontations between the Thai and Burmese militaries along the border.  
This situation shows that the internal affairs of some countries may threaten the 
security of their neighbors. In this specific example, the problem of human rights abuse in 
Burma impacts Thai Security; it is threatening the relationship between Thailand and 
Burma.  
Additionally, the Burmese refugees in Thailand affect Thai Security because 
some have been involved in many serious crimes. For example, Burmese refugees have 
been involved in seizing the Burmese embassy in October 1999 and the Ratchaburi 
regional hospital in January 2000. These two serious crimes were perceived as acts of 
terrorism in Thai territory. 
The first serious crime happened on 1 October 1999 when “five young men, 
calling themselves the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors, seized the Burmese Embassy 
in Bangkok.”34 This group, who opposed the Burmese government, demanded that the 
Burmese government release all political prisoners in Burma. However, the Burmese 
                                                 
33 CNN.com/WORLD, Thailand shuts Myanmar border Checkpoint, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/02/13/thailand.border> [20 May 2002]. 
34 Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule. Bangkok: White Lotus, Dhaka: University 
Press Ltd., London  New York: Zed Books. P.3. 
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government refused to free all political prisoners and called for the Thai government to 
arrest this group as quickly as possible. After negotiating with this group, the Thai 
government finally released the five gunmen in exchange for the freedom of people 
inside the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok. After releasing the five gunmen, the 
relationship between Thailand and Burma deteriorated because the Burmese regime was 
disappointed with the way the Thai government addressed the problem.  
In this incident, most Thais believed that the group of gunmen that seized the 
Burmese Embassy came from the Maneeloy refugee resettlement site. This site is located 
in Ratchaburi Province, 101 kilometers from Bangkok. Since most Burmese refugees in 
this site are opponents of the Burmese government, Thai security officials believed that 
the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors came from the Maneeloy refugee site. The news 
reported. 
They [Thai security officials] have announced a crackdown on an 
estimated 2,000 exiled Burmese students living in Bangkok and at a 
holding centre on the Thai/Burma border west of the capital, called 
Maneeloy, which was set up four years ago. Thai authorities believe it is 
from this open centre that the gunmen who took the Embassy by siege 
originated.35 
 
The second serious crime occurred three months later on January 23, 2000 when 
Burmese nationals seized the hospital in Ratchaburi Province. The group comprised 
Burmese rebels known as God’s Army. They hijacked a bus near the border and ordered 
the driver to take them to downtown Ratchaburi. This group made many demands on the 
Thai government. Saying that they would not release the hostages until all their demands 
were met. During that time, the 1200 hostages in the hospital were mostly patients and 
hospital staff.36  
This hostage incident threatened the Thais Security, especially those living in 
Ratchaburi Province. This province has a big shelter, Maneeloy, for Burmese refugees 
who have fled military rule. After the hostage incident, Thais living in Ratchaburi 
                                                 
35 BBC Online Network, World: Asia-Pacific Bangkok siege 'stank of conspiracy', Available [Online]: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_466000/466938.stm> [20 May 2002]. 
36 BBC Online Network, Hundreds held in Thai siege, Available [Online]: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ 
english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_616000/616247.stm> [20 May 2002]. 
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requested that the Thai government close the shelter and send the refugees back to Burma 
because most people in Ratchaburi believed that some of the ten Burmese rebels once 
were residents of the Maneeloy refugee site. 
Many of the Myanmar students who took hostages at the Myanmar 
embassy in Bangkok in November 1999 and at a Thai hospital in January 
2000 were one-time residents of the camp [Maneeloy].37 
 
Another threat to Thai Security is the Burmese economy. Burma is a poor 
country. According to a dichotomy based simply on income level that has been refined by 
the World Bank, Burma is in the group of low-income economies. It has an estimated 
average per capita income of $1200 (1999 est.) on a purchasing-power-parity basis.38 
Thailand is not a rich country; however, Thailand’s economy is in better shape than the 
Burmese economy. Thailand has an average per capita income of $6,400 (1999 est.) on a 
purchasing-parity basis. The minimum daily wage in Thailand is 162 Bath ($3.85).39 
Although the wage is comparably less than the wage in the United States, it is 
considerably higher than Burma’s daily wage. A laborer’s salary in Burma is normally 
less than $8 a month with the average minimum wage somewhere between $0.25-$0.28 a 
day.40 Because of the difference in the minimum daily wage between Thailand and 
Burma, thousands of Burmese workers seeking a higher income enter Thailand. Everyday 
these workers enter Thailand in the early morning and go back to Burma in the evening. 
Some of them stay for months to complete short-term projects, such as construction and 
harvest.41 Some workers who cannot find jobs near border provinces move further and 
further inward to non-border provinces. The last group has eventually become illegal 
worker settling down in the non-border provinces. 
                                                 
37 BBC online network, World: Asia-Pacific Bangkok siege ‘stank of conspiracy’, Available [Online]: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_466000/466938.stm> [22 May 2002].  
38 CIA World Factbook, Burma, Available [Online]: <http://web.lexis.com/universe/documen > [22 May 
2002]. 
39 Thailand, Available [Online]: <http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/ssptw/1999/English/thailand.pdf> [22 May 
2002].  
40 Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), The Burma/Cannada Connetion, Available [Online]: <http://www. 
maquilasolidarity.org/resources/garment/canadian.htm> [23 May 2002]. 
41 Aron Stern, Thailand’s Migration Situation and its Relations with APEC Members and Other Countries 
in Southeast Asia, Available [Online]: <http://www.chula.ac.th/INSTITUTE/ARCM/apect.htm> 
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These illegal workers become a big problem for Thailand. The Thai National 
Security Council always expresses concern that illegal Burmese workers will threaten 
Thai Security. They claim that Burmese illegal workers destroyed natural resources along 
the border, raised crime and prostitution rates, and created pockets of minorities; many 
carry diseases such as elephantiasis and malaria. For example, Ranong Province is 
presently facing the recurrence of elephantiasis. This disease, which had long disappeared 
from Thailand, is now spreading rapidly.42 
Furthermore, some of the illegal workers are involved in criminal activities, such 
as human trafficking, drug trafficking, prostitution, and crimes. For example, Burmese 
nationals were involved in the jailbreak from Samut Sakhon prison on November 23, 
2000.  
The Burmese prisoners took seven hostages, including jail wardens and the prison 
commissioner. The prisoners also killed a Buddhist teacher at the jail. Most of these 
prisoners were drug traffickers, who had come to Thailand as illegal unskilled workers. 
In fact, drug sellers have typically stayed within the group of illegal unskilled workers.43 
In summary, three main concerns surrounding Burma could impact Thai Security. 
First is the conflict between Burmese military and ethnic Burmese minorities along the 
Thai-Burmese border: the conflict exposes Thais living in that area to injury and loss of 
life. Second is the problem of Burmese refugees in Thai territory. Third is the problem of 
Burmese illegal workers in Thailand. The section found that the political turmoil in 
Burma causes conflict along the Thai-Burmese border and among the Burmese refugees 
in Thailand; whereas, the economic trouble in Burma causes illegal Burmese workers in 
Thailand.   
 
C. LAOS 
Laos, one of two communist countries in Southeast Asia, has a problem of ethnic 
minorities. In particular, the conflict between the Lao government and ethnic Hmongs 
still remains, requiring Thailand’s constant attention. Thailand does not want to intervene 
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in Lao internal affairs because of the fragile relationship between Thailand and Laos. 
Intervention may lead to conflict between both sides.  
Both countries have learned a lesson from the straggle over a disputed territory. 
From 1984 to early 1988, Laos and Thailand fought over a border area. When the 
fighting started, the Thai Armed Forces went to the battlefield with confidence because of 
its superior capabilities. However, the Thai forces could not defeat Lao forces; therefore, 
neither side won the fighting over the disputed area. The reason the dispute was not 
settled was due to military support from Vietnam for Laos. 
Laos gets military support from Vietnam to carry on prolonged fighting. One such 
source of evidence, among others, confirms that the Vietnamese military helped the 
Laotian military: 
Vietnam is apparently involved in helping to quash the Hmong rebellion. 
Eyebrows were raised in May 1998,when a plane carrying Hanoi’s chief 
of staff Lt.-Gen. Dao Trong Lich, and other top military officials crashed 
in Xieng Khuang province in northeastern Laos killing all on board.44 
 
The fighting between Thailand and Laos yielded painful results for both sides. It 
destroyed not only their relationship but also trading between Thailand and Laos. After a 
long struggle, Thailand and Laos compromised by pulling their military forces back from 
the disputed area and negotiating a settlement over the disputed area. 
When Thailand and Laos stopped fighting, trading between these two counties 
started again. Trading grew dramatically between 1988 and 1997; Thai investors became 
the biggest foreign investors in Lao.45 During that period, not only was the Lao economy 
closely tied with the Thai economy, but the relationship between the two countries was 
also strong.  
However, when an economic crisis hit Thailand in 1997, the Lao economy also 
crumbled because the Lao economy relied heavily on the Thai economy. 
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Thai investment in Laos, which was around US$5.5 billion between 1988 
and 1997, making Thailand the biggest foreign investor in Laos, also 
declined steeply as a result of the crisis.46 
 
Today the Lao economy still faces its economic trouble. Laos has an estimated average 
per capita income of $1,300 (1999 est.) on a purchasing-power-parity basis.47 The Lao 
economy has been among the slowest to recover from the Asian financial crisis: 
From June 1997 to June 1999 the Lao kip lost 87%, and reached a crisis 
point in September 1999 when it fluctuated wildly, falling from 3,500 kip 
to the dollar to 9,000 kip to the dollar in a matter of weeks.48 
 
As a result of the Asian economic crisis, trading and cooperation between the two 
countries promptly declined. Thailand reduced its electric power purchases from Laos 
because the need for electricity in Thailand dropped. This situation severely hampered 
Laos’ ability to generate revenues, because the sale of electric power was the major 
income for this country.49  
As a result of declining cooperation from Thailand, Laos started to rely more on 
Vietnam. With the Vietnamese military support again, Laos began to wipe out the ethnic 
Hmongs living along the Thai-Lao border. Thailand, therefore, worries that the fighting 
might affect Thai Security.  
In contrast, Laos believes that Thailand might support the ethnic Hmongs. This 
uncertainty is destroying the trust between Thailand and Laos and could trigger a new 
round of conflict over the disputed border, which is still indefinite. 
Summarizing the case between Thailand and Laos, the economies of both sides 
play a big in their relationship. The economic downturn has destroyed the trust once 
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evident between both sides. This distrust could be eliminated if the economies of 
Thailand and Laos were restored to a stable position. 
 
D. CAMBODIA 
Cambodia is an interesting country. Compared to Laos, the political situation 
within Cambodia is better. In 1975, both Laos and Cambodia faced seizure and control by 
Vietnam. During that time, the Khmer Rouge killed millions of people creating the 
legend of the Killing Fields. However, surprisingly Cambodia quickly stabilized its 
country. Today Cambodia has a constitutional monarchy, with elected government 
officials. Nevertheless, the Cambodian economy was also hurt by the Asian economic 
crisis. This country has an estimated average per capita income of $710 (1999 est.) on a 
purchasing-power-parity basis.50 
Thailand and Cambodia have never had a serious conflict. These days Cambodia 
has a good relationship with Thailand. Many Thai businesspeople choose to invest in this 
country because Thai businesspeople, having a good relationship with Cambodian 
officers, receive special privileges for doing business in Cambodia. Most of the Thai 
businesspeople develop and invest in the service and tourist sectors because Cambodia 
has many interesting places to visit. Most tourists come to Thailand first, and then go to 
Cambodia; therefore, cooperation between the two countries is mutually beneficial. Not 
only do Thai businesspeople have a good relationship with Cambodian politicians, but 
many Thai politicians have a good relationship with Cambodian politicians as well. 
In summary, the relationship between the Thai and Cambodian government is 
strong. There is no major conflict that would impact Thai Security. The good relationship 
between both sides derives from cooperation between both Thai and Cambodian 
businesspeople. The case of Cambodia confirms that the economy is a crucial factor in 
tightening the relationship between two countries. 
 
 
                                                 




Malaysia is one of the Southeast Asian countries hit by the Asian economic crisis. 
However, Malaysia has been able to survive the crisis because the country has strong 
economic foundations. Today Malaysia is attempting to become a developed country. 
One factor propelling Malaysia forward is the stability of Malaysian politics. Therefore, 
their goal to be a developed country is progressively growing closer.  
Regardless of their economic stability, Malaysia has some problems with its 
neighboring countries, such as the area in Borneo disputed by Indonesia, the state of 
Sabah disputed by Philippines, and the strait disputed by Singapore. Furthermore, the 
increasing influence of China seems to be a big concern for Malaysia. “Malaysia's 
military intelligence chief, Raja Rashid, announced publicly that China's intention was to 
obtain all of the Spratly island[s].”51All of these conflicts have motivated Malaysia to 
modernize its Armed Forces.  
Today Malaysia is purchasing many types of fighting aircraft from different 
countries, such as MiG-29s and SU-27/30s from Russia, F/A 18Ds from the USA, and 
Hawk Mk 208s from the UK. Moreover, Malaysia has a plan to buy many types of 
warships including submarines. These new weapons concern Malaysia’s neighbors, 
including Thailand, because these weapons are perceived as offensive weapons: 
The acquisition of such sophisticated aircraft as the F-16/18, SU-27/30 
and MiG-29s with their array of air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, plus 
maritime craft equipped with anti-ship missiles, would provide these 
ASEAN states not only with the capability to protect their territory but 
also to attack the territory of their neighbours.52  
 
Nevertheless, Thailand and Malaysia have never had a serious conflict. In fact, 
both countries have a rather strong cooperative relationship. For example, Thailand and 
Malaysia have an agreement to share the benefits of the Thai-Malaysian Joint 
Development Area; this area is plentiful in natural gas.  
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In summary, although the relationship between Thailand and Malaysia is strong, 
Thailand is monitoring the increasing capability of Malaysian forces. The new Malaysian 
military weapons might leave Thailand worse off, if a conflict occurs over the Thai-
Malaysian Joint Development Area. This issue could affect Thai interest in the future.  
 
F. THE KRA CANAL AND THAI SECURITY 
The chapter found that the influence of Thailand’s neighbors could threaten Thai 
Security in four ways:  
• The fighting between Burmese military and ethnic minority along the 
Thai-Burmese border could hurt Thais living in that area.  
• The Burmese refugees in Thailand could terrorize Thai Security. 
• The Burmese illegal workers in Thailand could threaten Thai Security.  
• The tension between Thailand and Laos could lead to a confrontation 
between both sides.  
The roots of possible conflicts are involved in both politics and the economy. The 
fighting along the Thai-Burmese border and the problem of the Burmese refugees in 
Thailand result from political turmoil in Burma, whereas the problem of the Burmese 
illegal workers in Thailand developed from the downturn in the Burmese economy. In 
contrast, the tension between Thailand and Laos is derived from both political and 
economic issues. 
If the roots of these conflicts were correctly remedied, the influence on Thai 
Security would decrease. Since the Kra Canal project would boost not only the Thai 
economy but also the regional economy, the conflicts that are rooted in the economic 
downturn might be solved.  
The economy of Laos would benefit if the Kra Canal is completed because Laos 
could effectively export its goods past Thailand to other countries. Laos, a landlocked 
country, has difficulty exporting its goods worldwide, as mention by Dr. Khamkhan 
Naphawong, General Secretary, the Ministry of Trade and Tourism, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic.  
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I would like to make a request to all Thai businessmen, relevant 
organizations and Thai officers who have sincerely implemented business 
with Laos, to help providing a means to the shipping of Laos goods past 
Thailand.53 
 
Moreover, when the Kra Canal project is completed, the need for electricity in 
Thailand would tremendously increase. Therefore, Thailand has to increase its electricity 
purchases from Laos. Both situations would benefit the Lao economy and strengthen the 
tie between Thailand and Laos. 
The Kra Canal project also benefits the Burmese economy, because Burma could 
export its goods at a lower cost by using the Kra Canal. This ability to export would 
stimulate the Burmese economy. When the Burmese economy recovers, the influx of the 
Burmese illegal workers in Thailand should decrease.  
Furthermore, Thailand could conceivably give incentives to Burma for using the 
Kra Canal in exchange for improving human rights abuses in Burma. Today Burma needs 
help from its neighbors to improve its economy. The visit of General Khin Nyunt, 
Burma’s intelligence chief, to Thailand is a good example that Burma needs Thai 
assistance to help the Burmese economy recover. 
For his part, Khin Nyunt needs Thailand's help, not just to improve his 
country's image, but also to revive Burma's economy, which he is 
responsible for managing and which this year has deteriorated to the point 
of collapse.54 
 
If Thailand could convince Burma to reduce human rights abuses in exchange for 
Thai assistance, the problem of fighting along the Thai-Burmese border and the problem 
of the Burmese refugees in Thailand should improve. 
Finally, when the Kra Canal project is completed, Thailand would have to build 
up its Armed Forces to protect the canal. Increasing the Thai Armed Forces would not 
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A. THE KRA CANAL 
The Kra Canal project will excavate a canal to connect the Gulf of Thailand and 
the India Ocean. Since the idea of excavating the Kra Canal occurred in 1677, Thailand 
and foreign countries have attempted to excavate the canal at least five different times:  
1. In 1677, the French received permission from King Narai the Great to 
survey and excavate the canal. 
2. In 1793, Phra Rajawangborworn Mahasurasihanat, King Rama I’s brother, 
proposed to excavate the canal because he believed that the canal would 
be the fastest way to send reinforcements to help towns along the 
Andaman Sea. 
3. In 1858, the British received permission from King Rama IV to excavate 
the canal. 
4. In 1958, the Thai government granted permission to study the feasibility 
of the Kra Canal to Mr. K.Y. Chow. 
5. In 1970, Mr. K.Y Chow again was granted permission to study the 
feasibility of the Kra Canal. 
None of these attempts, however, succeeded because they incurred a variety of 
problems. Today a sixth attempt to excavate the canal is being considered. This attempt 
has become a controversial issue in Thai society. Opponents believe that the project 
might impact both the Thai economy and security; whereas, supporters argue that the 
security issues are no longer a vital problem for Thailand. They claim that the canal, 
itself, would provide many advantages for Thailand by enhancing the Thai Sea Power 
and contributing to Thai Security. In response to these arguments, the thesis examined the 
following two hypotheses. 
 
B. HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses of this thesis are (1) the Kra Canal would enhance Thai Sea 
Power; and (2) the Kra Canal would contribute to Thai Security. 
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1. First Hypothesis 
The analysis in Chapter III supports the thesis that the Kra Canal would enhance 
Thai Sea Power since the canal benefits both the Royal Thai Navy and Thai maritime 
commerce. 
a. The Royal Thai Navy 
 When the Kra Canal project is completed, the canal will become a new 
passageway between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Ocean. This passageway 
would provide two strategic advantages for the Royal Thai Navy: 
• In the event of a crisis on the Andaman Ocean, the Third Naval Area 
Command could request timely reinforcements from the Sattahip Naval 
Base. 
• During peacetime, the Royal Thai Navy could manage its naval forces in 
effectively protecting Thai maritime interests on both sides. 
From this viewpoint, the Kra Canal would increase the Royal Thai Navy’s 
capabilities to counter challenges at sea during a crisis while helping the Royal Thai 
Navy to protect Thai maritime interests during peacetime as well. 
b. Thai maritime commerce 
The Kra Canal also geographically positions Thailand along a sea line of 
communication. As a result of this new position, Thailand would have the capability 
promoting its maritime commerce. 
• Thai ports would become more competitive: vessels would use Thai ports 
when they pass through the Kra Canal. 
• The canal provides an incentive for sea liners to register their vessels as 
Thai ships, which allow these vessels the possibility of a lower fee for 
passing through the Kra Canal. 
• Thai shipyards would increase their vessel repair services because vessels 
on long journeys would need repairing for damages. These vessels would 
stop for repairs at Thai shipyards before continuing their journey.  
• Thais looking for a job would benefit from increasing of jobs associated 
with maritime commerce. 
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• The Thai fishing fleet could sail to both oceans without passing through 
the water of Thailand’s neighboring countries. 
2. Second Hypothesis 
The analysis in Chapter IV supports the contribution of the Kra Canal to Thai 
Security since it benefits Thailand in handling tension involving its neighbors.  
a. Burmese case 
 Thailand could conceivably give incentives to Burma for using the Kra 
Canal in exchange for improving human rights abuses in Burma. This solution not only 
helps the Burmese economy but also decreases the fighting between Burmese military 
and ethnic minorities along the Thai-Burmese border. When the human rights abuses in 
Burma decrease, the problem of Burmese refugees in Thailand therefore will lessen. 
Finally when the Burmese economy is healthy, the influx of Burmese illegal workers in 
Thailand should reduce. 
b. Lao case 
 The distrust between Thailand and Laos could be eliminated, if the Kra 
Canal project were completed. This project, as a result, would stimulate the economy of 
both Laos and Thailand.  
c. Malaysian case  
To protect the Kra Canal effectively, Thailand would have to build up its 
Armed Forces. Increasing Thai Armed Forces would also benefit Thailand, if a conflict 
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